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From its first line, Giinter Frankenberg's article Critical Comparisons, published
twenty years ago,' leaves no doubt as to its radical claim and aspiration. Nothing
short of attempting to "re-think" comparative law, the article sets out to attack
many of the dearly held beliefs in the scholarship and practice of comparative law.
The beliefs, the history, the believers, their work and struggles - they are all there.
Frankenberg plows through them in order to lay bare what he conceives of as being
an incorrectly defended myth of scholarly objectivity among many of the field's
pioneers and contemporary protagonists. Not being alone in his struggle of fiercely
assailing the citadels of a nearly century-old comparativist scholarly venture,2 his
crucial contribution to the field cannot now be denied. Whether we consider its
open, frank, almost casual style, or its wide reaching theoretical reach, Critical
Comparisons remains one of the most eminent articulations of the crisis of
comparative law in its first century.3 At the time of the article's 20th birthday, it is
Osgoode Hall Law School York University, Toronto, Canada and Co-Editor in Chief, German Law
Journal. E: PZumbansen@osgoode yorku.ca. Dedicated to Gtinter Frankenberg, a wonderful teacher,
scholar, and friend, on his birthday on 19 June 2005. This paper was written for the inofficial Liber
Ainicoruni for Gtinter Frankenberg, entitled Asthetik der Begegnungen.
I Gtinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411-455
(1985).
2 See, e.g., Jonathan Hill, Comparative Law, Law Reform and Legal Theory, 9 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 101-115
(1989). More recently, see Ralf Michaels, Im Westen Nichts Neues? Zumn Stand der Rechtsvergleichung 100
Jahre nach dew Pariser Kongress, 66 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES
PRIVATRECHT 97 (2002); Ralf Michaels, Book Review - Annelise Riles (ed.) Rethinking the Masters of
Comparative Law (Hart Publishing 2001), 4 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 411-417 (2003); Ralf Michaels, Ffinf
Minuten Rechtsvergleichung, 4 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 239-242 (2004).
1 For a collection of contemporary explorations into the contested discipline, see COMPARATIVE LEGAL
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS (Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday eds., 2004). Certainly,
one could also consider how the writing on the "masters of comparative law" unfolds in writing about
comparative law today. See Michaels, Book Review, supra note 2.
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time to recollect, reassess and reconsider its main arguments and to play them back
to the author and his readers. After a brief reconstruction of the article's main
contentions (Part B), this brief homage will contextualize the article within a larger
attempt among comparativists and legal theorists to work towards a transnational
legal science (Part C).
B. Overcoming the Cinderella Complex
Critical Comparisons picks up Harold Gutteridge's characterization of comparative
law as a sleeping Cinderella, waiting for her prince to recognize her beauty and to
kiss her into life.4 Frankenberg analyzes the "Cinderella Complex" and cautions
against casual dismissal of its causes and symptoms. "The lack of interest among
law teachers and students is real," Frankenberg warns.5 In presenting the most
common objections that lead to a marginalization of comparative law in academic
teaching and research, not to mention the almost total neglect of the field in the
practice of law, Frankenberg lays out a panorama of constraints under which legal
education has to exist, which, in many ways, parallels contemporary assessments of
what law students supposedly "need from law school." 6 We see here, again, a
"closing of the mind" (a la H Bloom), only that it cannot be opened by returning to
the study of the classics. Instead, Frankenberg's analysis of the Cinderella Complex
succeeds in striking a fine balance in acknowledging the weight of the obstacles in
the discipline's attempted rise to relevance (if not fame) on the one hand and its
hidden potentials for an overcoming strategy on the other.
I. The Reign of Functionalism
Frankenberg's shattering critique of the wide-ranging absence of theory in
comparative law and, therewith, of the ultimate lack of critical self-examination,
culminates in the exposition of what he identifies as the two reigning paradigms in
comparative law. The first is called the "juxtaposition plus" paradigm and it is
4 Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 418-9; HAROLD COOKE GUTTERIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE METHOD OF LEGAL STUDY AND RESEARCH (1949). However, some have observed that the
Cinderella debate regarding comparative law - while still echoing here and there - has come to and end.
See Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 4
GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1-29 (2004), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/.
5 Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 419.
6 See the critique by Harry Arthurs. Harry Arthurs, Poor Canadian Legal Education: So Near to Wall Street,
So Farfroin God, in: 38 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 381 (2000).
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characterized by an allegedly objective confrontation of comparable institutions,
rules and doctrines from one legal culture to the other. Certainly, one does not have
to seek far to uncover the very subjective inclinations of the scientist in searching
out his examples and targets of comparison. 7 Their classification on the basis of
their "likeness" and their grouping in "families," "styles" and "traditions" assumes
the "commonality of problems in, say, Botswana, the People's Republic of China,
Egypt and California (representing the West)." 8 This gives the comparativist "a
'method' of doctrinal jurisprudence" with which she can compare "legal rules and
statutes and theories of different systems in order to formulate or at least indicate
the general principles and precepts, common cores or the constants of law." 9 There
is a crucial home bias that is driving the comparativist's strategy and research: "The
implied adequacy of law to solve what appear to be universal and perennial
problems of life in society betrays and underscores not only how the
comparativist's own country's approach is supposed and privileged, but more
particularly with respect to the United States, British German, and French studies
[... ] how their notion of law is itself privileged."10 Ultimately, the juxtaposition-plus
approach is based on a fundamental legocentric position,11 one that is characterized
by treating law "as a given and a necessity, as the natural path to ideal, rational or
optimal conflict resolutions and ultimately to a social order guaranteeing peace and
harmony."12 We shall come back to this thought.
The second approach identified by Frankenberg as central to contemporary
comparative studies is labeled "comparative legal finctionalism."13 It is indeed
characterized by a painful avoidance of what - according to Frankenberg - would
regularly have to be the prerequisite of any meaningful functional comparison. It
would be of vital importance to "assay either what 'the law' is or what 'the same
function' could be."14 Instead, the comparativist will hardly ever engage in the
former while usually providing quite arbitrary justifications for the latter. In
reducing the problem of dealing with several unknowns to an assertive and






13 Id., at 434.
14 Id., at 436.
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pragmatic strategy, the comparativist will seek to compare what is comparable, and
hereby target similar or functionally comparable laws as well as functions. While
adopting an evolutionary theory of law to grasp a large, wide-open range of
societal activities and values that shape the foreign legal field, the comparativist
will regularly target "certain specialized agencies (courts, legislatures, etc.),
negating or marginalizing the effects of legal forms and ideas in the realm of
consciousness as ideologies and rituals."15 It is here that the legocentric bias unfolds
in its fullest potential. "By stressing the production of 'solutions' through legal
regulations, the functionalist dismisses as irrelevant or does not even recognize that
law also produces and stocks interpretive patterns and visions of life which shape
people's ways of organizing social experience, giving it meaning, qualifying it as
normal and just or as deviant or unjust."16
Frankenberg leaves no doubt as to the affirmative and reactionary thrust in the
functionalist approach when he observes that "[fjunctionalism has no eye and no
sensitivity for what is not formalized and not regulated under a given legal regime.
What started out as a fascinating hypothetical experiment has turned into a rather
dry affirmation of legal formalism."1 7 Its reactionary content and its alleged
objectivity's "false modesty" is revealed when the language of legal problem is
translated into the language of universal problems. Frankenberg's right-on
targeting of Zweigert's and Kdtz's crystal clear exposition of this functionalist
approach I8 lays bare the still very powerful functionalist approaches in private law
oriented comparative research.19 In light of a continuously defended, un-political,
value-neutral private law, now available to govern and organize trade exchanges
on global markets, 20 the critique put forward by Frankenberg and elsewhere cannot
be loud enough.
21
15 Id., at 438.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Compare ZWEIGERT AND KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 25 (T. Weir trans., 3d ed.
1977).
19 For a critique, see, e.g., Zumbansen, Europe's Darkr Legacies. Notes on 'Mirr Reflections, the
'Constitution as Fetish', and other such linkages between the Past and the Future, 43 OSGOODE HALL LAW
JOURNAL (forthcoming 2005).
20 KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1996).
21 For the field of labor law, see the harsh critique by Manfred Weiss. Manfred Weiss, The Future of
Coinparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and as a Practical Tool, 25 COMPARATIVE LABOR LAW AND
POLICY JOURNAL 169-181 (2003). Weiss argues for a much wider functional approach, that reaches out to
the larger regulatory, hard and soft law, environment as well as to underlying methodological questions
and concerns of comparing different functions. See also William Scheuermann, Franz Neumann -A Legal
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Frankenberg rightly states that a minimal requirement of a functionalist
comparative method would be the recognition of the need to provide for at least a
rudimentary assessment of the underlying understanding of "law" as such, in the
comparative enterprise. However, it is precisely this perspective that is not taken.
In asserting that legal regimes generally serve similar purposes, the functionalist
approach can gloss over the unanswered question of what defines the legal regime
in the first place.22 The fundamental assertion, as a result, leads to the assimilation
of the foreign legal system to the domestic legal system as only those things already
recognized as familiar (and thus comparable) appear on the comparative radar
screen.
But, what would be the alternative? "Are we obliged to study the history, economy,
sociology, psychology and politics of law?" 23 Surely, this would surpass anybody's
capacities. In appropriating, thus, the comparative research agenda, a "realistic"
approach wins the day and muddling through - alone and in international teams -
emerges as a possible approach. Frankenberg deciphers the strange dilemma
constantly faced by the functional comparativist: "suppressing the context and
considering it," "moving from the general (function) to the specific without
knowing what makes the specific specific." 24 "The functionalist negates the
interaction between legal institutions and provisions by stripping them from their
systemic context and integrating them in an artificial universal typology of
'solutions'. In this way, 'function' is reified as a principle of reality and not taken as
an analytical principle that orders the real world. It becomes the magic carpet that
shuttles between the abstract and the concrete, that transcends the boundaries of
national legal concepts, that builds the system of comparative law, the 'universal'
comparative legal science of 'the general law.'"' 25
II. Comparative Law Thrown Back Onto Itself. Seeing, Learning, Changing
It is against this background or, to put it differently, in this dimly lit room of
comparative law scholarship, that Frankenberg ignites a torch of critique and
Theorist of Globalization?, 35 KRITISCHE JUSTIz 79-89 (2002); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE AUTHORITY,
PUBLIC POWER (2003).
2' Frankenberg, supra, note 1, at 436 (with references to ZWEIGERT AND KOTZ, supra note 18).
2 d. at 439.




reconstruction. In short: comparative law is to become a learning experience and for
it to become one, we must first acknowledge the complexity of the challenge, which
alone defies all easy answers and remedies. "Comparative Law never had too little
baggage in the overhead compartment. To this very day it is crammed with
thoughts and oughts, with aims and claims." 26 His central and ultimately liberating
proposal consists in the suggestion to understand comparative law as
"empowering and liberating, provided that we do not take our terms of and
perspective on law for granted but are open to a radical re-evaluation of the
domestic legal consciousness."
27
Following this intuition to a much more un-defined, "ambiguous" 28 and open-
ended approach to legal analysis, Frankenberg can indeed formulate a radically
more powerful and uncompromising self-critique of the very instruments
employed in the comparative undertaking. Reflecting on the un-defining, negating,
non-identical potential of an always already appropriated and biased legal
understanding, comparative law becomes (just) another exercise in legal critique per
se. Beginning with a critique of comparative law's placing of "law" in the center of
its endeavor, the next step is to critique law itself. Surely, this is reflective of a basic
distrust in or, even fear of law's power.29 And, it reaches out to embrace other
avenues of legal critique, as there are legal anthropology30 and political science.
31
Frankenberg posits comparative law as an empowering critical exercise through
which to illuminate the marginalized, the excluded and silenced voices in the other
- and one's own - legal (socio-economic, political and cultural) regime. In this
respect, Frankenberg premeditates the central gist of Harold Koh's powerful
evocation of domestic legal theory and legal discourse as a prerequisite and core
element of transnational legal critique. 32 Reconstructing a particular legal discourse
will ultimately help in identifying the hidden agendas and background
assumptions that inform our appropriation of foreign legal systems, their -
26 Id. at 441.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 See Douglas Hay, Time, Inequality, and Law-s Violence, in LAW=S VIOLENCE 141-173 (Austin Sarat and
Thomas Kearns eds., 1992); Cornelia Vismann, Jurisprudence: A Transfer Science, 10 LAW AND CRITIQUE
279-286 (1999); Costas Douzinas, Violence, Jnstice, Deconstruction, 6 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 171-178 (2005).
30 See, e.g., Sally Merry Engle, Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANNUAL REVIEW OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 357-379 (1992).
31 
A.CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC AUTHORITY (2003).
32 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 181-206 (1996).
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assumed - differences and similarities. Comparative law, then, is akin to a
fundamental critique of "law and development," which has convincingly been
shown to be crucial for importing as well as for exporting countries.33 Whereas the
neo-liberal strand in law and development continues to carve out the quasi-natural,
market based self-ordering mechanics of contract and property law,34 the rules of
contract law are as little "natural" as they are "pre"- or "extra legal", or merely
technical.
35
Redirecting the focus back to the domestic legal order, legal rules, principles and
institutions need to be exposed to critique as much as other phenomena of the
political order. Only then can we identify law's power in shaping social order and,
simultaneously, being shaped by it.3 6 In this light, we can regain a perspective on
the frailty of law, its very fragility and vulnerability as a guarantor of political
voice. In taking law for granted, in understanding it as our "second nature," we fail
to engage in legal critique. "A pervasive legal consciousness keeps us in a
Kafkaesque, fascinating and terrifying world of rights and duties, rules and
standards, procedures and punishments.37 It is not so much the law's institutional
framework or symbolic representation, not so much courts, texts and arguments or
conscious use of the instruments of law. It is rather its hidden-ness and
pervasiveness as a social agenda and as our 'second nature' framing our minds,
kindling fantasies, structuring and limiting our social visions, and influencing our
actions - that account for its mystique and magic spell."
38
Comparative law, ironically, provides for a distance to the domestic legal order,
while it redirects the analytical focus back onto it. Studying law in a foreign system,
analyzing the ambiguity of legal and social and political and economic rule,
reminds us of law's other, social nature. This has a strong impact on our
understanding of the emergence and creation of law, as it will likely illuminate the
11 See KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING (2002); Kerry Rittich, Enchantments of
Reason/Coercions in Law, 57 MIAMI LAW REVIEW 727-742 (2003).
14 Richard Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK OBSERVER 1-11
(1998).
3 RITTICH, su pra. note 33.
36 This theme is unfolded by Frankenberg himself. See Giinter Frankenberg, The Learning Sovereign, in 2
ANNUAL OF GERMAN & EUROPEAN LAW 2004 (Russell Miller and Peer Zumbansen eds., forthcoming
2005).
17 Douglas Hay, Time, Inequality, and Law's Violence, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 141-173 (Austin Sarat and
Thomas Kearns eds., 1992).
38 Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 447.
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alternatives to legal order as well. This will ultimately not only open our eyes for
the complex regulatory scheme in the studied foreign jurisdiction but also for the
ambiguities of hard and soft law, official and non-official law in our domestic legal
regime. Using the example of the comparative study of abortion rights in foreign
jurisdictions, Frankenberg powerfully unfolds a re-conceptualized comparative
agenda, one that aims at critiquing its own terminological and conceptual baggage
in order to gain a clearer view on the dispute "there" as well as "here." In tracing
the steps of "juridifying" the political struggle over abortion, the comparativist
contributes to a deeper understanding of how societal conflict gets translated into
law and ultimately isolated, detached and "alienated" from its social context.39
Laying bare the isolating thrust of juridification, the icing effect of legalization of a
dynamic and constantly evolving social practice,40  reconnects this re-
conceptualized comparative analysis to both the radical critique of legal
formalism4' and of the wide-reaching regulatory reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. 42 It
reassesses various national narratives of law reform and exposes them to a
fundamental critique of their impetus and outcomes. Frankenberg's re-thinking of
comparative law, then, must be seen in unfolding a radical program of legal
critique as part of societal practice in the context of historical, political struggles.
While some of Critical Comparisons' connecting points with parallel undertakings in
legal critique - such as law and development or anthropology - have already
briefly been alluded to, there is yet another dimension worth extrapolating.
Frankenberg's article, in its very last pages, points to yet another potential of re-
conceptualized comparative legal thinking, one that indeed takes away the ground
on which comparative legal science has come to rest and on which it can no longer
sit too comfortably. "Critical comparison extracts from beneath the claims of legal
rationality competing political visions and contradictory normative ideals. Not
mesmerized by intricacies of legal reasoning in terms of the public/private
distinction and arguments for or against judicial activism or self-restraint, the
1, Gunther Teubner and Peer Zumbansen, Rechtseuitftendungen: Uber den Meh nert des Zwblften Kamnels, 21
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR RECHITSSOZIOLOGIE 189-215 (2000) [English version: Alienating Justice: On the Social
Surplus of thue Twelfth Camel, in CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL AUTOPOIESIS 2144 (Nelken and Priban eds.,
2001)].
40 See the illuminating analysis in CUTLER, supra note 21.
41 Most recently, see Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logical Formal Legal Rationality, 55 HASTINGS
LAW JOURNAL 1031-1076 (2004).
4' See Rudolf Wietholter, Proceduralization of the Category of Law, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN
AMERICAN-GERMAN DEBATE 501-510 (Christian Joerges and David M. Trubek eds., 1985); Gunther
Teubner, Juridification - Concepts, Aspects, Linits, Solutions, in, JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3-48
(GUNTHER TEUBNER ED., 1987); PEER ZUMBANSEN, ORDNUNGSMUSTER IM MODERNEN WOHLFAHRTSSTAAT.
LERNERFAHRUNGEN ZWISCHEN STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT UND VERTRAG (2000).
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'distanced' comparativist uncovers the political underpinnings of legal doctrines
and decisions, thus working towards a political theory of the law."43 It is this
emerging utopia that the concluding section of this paper attempts to outline.
C. The 'Oath of the Comparativists' and the Crusade of 'Critical Comparisons'
I. What's in a picture?
David's painting The Oath of the Horatians of 1784 depicts the conflict between
heroic men willing to die for the public good - standing at the center of the picture
- and disconcerted, allegedly weak, family members and relatives, feminine, should
there be any doubt, on the right hand side, gazing upon the rallying of the heroes in
despair and hope that none of what they see is actually true. To spare many men's
and women's lives, it is decided that the conflict between Rome and Alba Longa be
resolved by the fight among six of their best men. In spite of expectations of Rome's
inevitable victory, two Horatians fall instantaneously and the third, facing
inevitable death, escapes. The three Curatians, bearing wounds of different
intensity take up the chase with various aptitude. The least wounded catches up
with the fleeing Horatian who takes him by surprise. The same fate will end the
lives of the other two hunters, leaving the Horatian surviving. Returning, he is
hailed victor, but his sister, mourning the death of her husband - one of the fallen
Curatians - and calling her brother a murderer, is killed by him. He is now a
triumphant warrior - and a murderer. As a murderer he is killed, as both a
murderer and a triumphant savior of peace, he is commemorated.
What does the painting actually show of all this? We know that (one of) the men in
the public sphere shall carry away first triumph, then condemnation while the
women congregating in private will suffer irreparable losses. The French
Revolution is upon David and his contemporaries and heroic acts are in demand.
The demarcation of the warriors and the worriers is brought to its extremes under
extreme circumstances. Whether it is the war between Rome and Alba that
necessitated the courageous battle among a handful of chosen representatives for
their cities, or whether it is a different crisis or state of exception, the pressure on
identifying the place of decision-making power will regularly lead to the exclusion
of alternatives.44 In Bertolt Brecht's drama The Horatians and the Curatians, we only
41 Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 452.
41 See Martti Koskenniemi, "The Lady Doth Protest Too Much." Kosovo and the Turn to Ethics in hIternational
Law, 65 MODERN LAW REVIEW 159-175 (2002); Martti Koskenniemi, Book Review - GIOVANNA BORADORI
(ED.), PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR. DIALOGUES WIRH JURGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA
(2003), 4 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1087-1094 (2003), available at
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learn of the deadly fight between the six warriors, while the drama ends before the
return of the surviving warrior and the death of this widowed sister.45 Heiner
Mfiller's drama, The Horatian, in contrast, focuses only on this aftermath, exploring
the fate of the returning warrior being "victor and murderer." Here, the warrior is
convicted for the murderer of his sister, executed and then re-assembled, thereby
expressing the irreconcilable and yet inseparable dimensions of his doing.46 Both
plays make clear - as does the painting - that how we tell the story determines how
we remember what happened.
The painting captures and eventually eternalizes a set of conceptions that could just
as well be proven correct by subsequent historical events as they could also be mere
images of what the artist had in mind with regard to the real world. That the
painter had chosen to depict the time before the tragedy instead of a later moment,
inevitably works towards the consolidation of the public, heroic oath and all that
follows while dismissing, marginalizing, and ultimately silencing the weak
elements of this historical moment. While David's depiction of the world of men
and of the world of women already premeditates the coming of civil society with
the slowly beginning erosion of the private sphere and a subsequent need of re-
orientation and re-definition of female identity, both worlds are still hyper-stated in
their polarity. One is not the other and both are held as counterpoints between
which only a strong hand shall strike the balance. Historical differences - here
between the conflict of Rome and Alba Longa and the dawning French Revolution
- are made to disappear by the usage of the imagery in its present time.47
II. Words Conflicts Are Made Of
So, the conflict(s) that we find expressed in the painting - what are we to do with
them today? In what language are we to speak of them? Doing history justice is just
as presumptuous a project as rendering an adequate picture of foreign legal order.
The insightful comparativists have consistently pointed to the domestic learning
effects of comparative law, and we are well advised to pursue this idea a little
http/ /www.germanlawiournalcom/pdf/VolO4NolO/PDF Vol 04 No 10 1087-
1094 Legal Culture Koskemwiemi.pdf.
45 Bertolt Brecht, Die Horatier und die Kuriatier, in DER OZEANFLUG/ DIE HORATIER UND DIE
KURIATIER/ DIE MANAHME 29 (1980).
46 Heiner Mtiller, Der Kuratie, in WERKE 4: DIE STUCKE 2 (2001).
47 Most remarkably, see Reinhart Koselleck, Vergangene Zukunft der frihen Neuzeit, in VERGANGENE
ZUKUNFT. ZUR SEMANTIK GESCHICHTLICHER ZEITEN 17, 18 (1979).
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further. In a world in which the struggle of "transnational" legal discourses against
the predominance of "international" ones48 marks contemporary debates, 49 we can
clearly recognize a parallel struggle within our domestic legal disputes.
Frankenberg's article Down By Law of 1989 is exactly that,50 a very concise
reconstruction of the progression of legal theory's grand themes. Assuming a
transatlantic perspective, Down By Law succeeds in bringing together poignant
writings from Europe and the US and Canada to sketch the progress in theoretical
thinking about the law - what it is, what it is not and what it might come to be51 -
has taken in the course of the last 150 years. His article is cogenial to accounts such
as Robert Gordon's Critical Legal Histories,52 Roberto Unger's Critical Legal Studies
Movement 53and Harold Koh's Transnational Legal Process.54 All these contributions
share a powerful narrative that has immense repercussions for the further
development of comparative law. They reflect the very nervousness and sensibility
of domestic legal discourses as their participants recognize and unfold the
connections between "their" critical discourses and those unfolding in other social,
political, economic and legal cultures. 55 This sense of being directly affected by
"legal" struggles elsewhere is shared in an emerging global legal discourse. This is
not to say that we have attained a global civil society, or a cosmopolitan global law.
48 See PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 6-13 (1957). For a restatement of this struggle, see, e.g., Neil
Walker, Postnational Constitutionalismn and the Problen of Translation, in CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE
STATE 27 (J.H.H. Weiler and M. Wind eds., 2003); Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical
Touchdown: The Regulatonj Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUMBIA
JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 209-274 (2002); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan Smits ed., forthcoming 2005).
49 See Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-nent of Non-State Law, WAYNE LAW REVIEW (forthconing 2005).
50 Id.
,1 Rudolf Wietholter, Recht-Fertigungen eines Gesellschaftsrechts, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT: RECHT-
FERTIGUNGEN ZWISCHEN PRIVATRECHTSDOGMATIK UND GESELLSCHAFTSTHEORIE (Christian Joerges and
Gunther Teubner eds., 2003).
5' Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
51 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, 7e Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563-675 (1983).
34 Supra, note 32.
55 See Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study, 7
LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 719-746 (1973); Laurence R. Helfer, Constitutional Analogies in the International
Legal System, 37 LOY. L. A. L. REV. 193-236 (2003); Russell A. Miller, Lords of Deniocracy: The Judicialization
of 'Pure Politics' in the United States and in Germany, 61 WASHINGTON & LEE LAW REVIEW 587-662 (2003);
Paul Schiff Berman, Fiow International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 485 (2005); Michaels, supra note 49; Viktor Winkler, Dubious Heritage: The German




For now, pluralism and conflict, colliding discourses, 56 seem to determine the
emergence of a global legal order.
Terminology (the "state," "rights," private autonomy," "rule of law," "sovereign
equality," etc.) continue to distort the dialogue and learning relationship between
the discussants in different discourses, while at the same time providing starting
points for respective deconstructions of the underlying history of the terms' use in
respective legal etc. cultures. 57 The parallelism of legal inquiry between the
international/transnational level and the domestic level - there between states and
non-state actors, here between state and non-state law, "form and substance,"
"public and private," must be taken into account for comparative law to realize its
aspirations of actually explaining what the law is elsewhere. The erosion of
boundaries of intellectual discourses and the interpenetration of political,
economical and cultural struggles with little regard to territorial boundaries has for
a long time already led to cross-fertilizations,58 transplants59 and irritants.
60
Comparative Law is not unfrozen in time, or is it? Just like David's painting or, just
like transnational legal discourses, comparative law is part of a deeper critique of
law itself. It is always already part of an ongoing process of reflection, critique and
- irony. The irony of the fast world of legal publications, the frenzy of getting
another piece out and circulating it even beyond the ever increasing number of
witnesses in footnote 1, lies in the fact that an article on comparative law, written
some twenty years ago, still has got it right.
56 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unih in
the Fragnientation of Global Law, 25 MICHIGANJ. INT'L L. 999-1045 (2004).
57 Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUROPEAN LAW
JOURNAL 400-432 (2002); Peer Zumbansen, Sustaining Paradox Boundaries: Perspectives on the Internal
Affairs in Domestic and International Law, 15 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 197-211 (2004).
' Helfer, supra note 55; ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
59 ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (2d ed. 1993). For a recent self-reassessment, see Alan Watson,
Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4 ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW (December
2000), available at lt/://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html (defending his approach against the attack of
Pierre Legrand).
60 Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Diferences, in VARIETIES OF
CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 417-441 (Peter Hall and
David Soskice. eds., 2001).
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